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Unanimity, anonymity, and infinite population*

Susumu Cato†‡§

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Abstract

This paper is concerned with the implications of unanimity and anonymity for the Arrovian social choice theory when population is infinite. Contrary to the finite population case, various unanimity and anonymity axioms can be formulated. We show a tension between unanimity and anonymity by providing possibility and impossibility results. We also examine the case in which social preferences are allowed to be quasi-transitive.

Keywords: Social choice; Arrow's impossibility theorem; unanimity; anonymity; ultrafilter **JEL classification:** D71

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