

# Monitoring and disincentives in containing paid sick leave

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## Highlights

- Exploiting a set of reforms, I analyze the impact of monitoring and monetary incentives on paid sick leave in the Italian public sector, using the private sector as the control group
- Sickness absence is sensitive both to physicians' monitoring and to wage cuts on short sick leaves
- Monitoring is more effective for men while women were more sensitive to the monetary incentives
- No increase in other types of leave is detected

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