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Stable Polymorphism of Cooperators and Punishers in a Public Goods Game

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6 Highlights

- · We studied the coevolution of cooperation and punishment.
- Performing punishment is regarded as a contribution to public in this study.
- ⁹ This norm makes globally stable coexistence of cooperation and punishment possible.
- Division of labor between cooperation and punishment is stably maintained.

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