



## Is safety a subject for science?

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### ABSTRACT

In this paper I will not so much address the status of safety science as a science, but rather address the status or meaning of safety. So instead of entering into a discussion of whether safety science is a proper science – whatever that means – the focus will be on whether the notion of safety itself is a proper subject for scientific investigation or indeed whether safety as such is an appropriate topic or subject for a scientific discipline.

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### 1. Introduction

The invitation, or perhaps the challenge, to submit a paper for this special issue of safety science, questioned the notion of *safety science* as a proper science. Or that was at least how I interpreted the invitation. It was mentioned, for instance, that the status of *safety science* is contested, and this presumably referred to its status as a science. The call also listed several potential controversies, for instance between a 'normative', and a 'descriptive', view, between a 'realist' and a 'constructivist' view, and between viewing safety as 'resulting' or as 'emerging'.

In this paper I will not so much address the status of *safety science* as a science, but rather address the status or meaning of *safety*. So instead of entering into a discussion of whether *safety science* is a proper science – whatever that means – the focus will be on whether *safety* itself is a proper subject for scientific investigation or indeed whether safety as such is an appropriate topic or subject for a scientific discipline.

In order to do so it is necessary to assume that there exists some kind of agreement about the meaning of the term an 'appropriate scientific subject' and therefore also about the meaning of the term 'science'. This agreement need not exist among everyone but must at least be found within a certain community, in this case the community of safety scientists. There is no way of avoiding this thorny issue – short of the irresponsible attitude that takes for granted that we all know what the terms mean and that they mean the same to us all. The issue will nevertheless be given short shrift by resorting to the common definitions that easily can be found in both printed and electronic knowledge repositories. While the

Latin word *scientia* means 'knowledge', the modern use of science refers to the ways in which knowledge is pursued, as much as to the knowledge itself. *Safety science* is therefore taken to refer both to what we know about *safety* and to the ways we have built and continue to build this knowledge. In other words, to how we study the subject matter, which in this case is *safety* itself.

If the common definitions are accepted, then a science must have a more or less well-defined topic, focus, or object (phenomenon) that can be studied. It must have a paradigm, as argued by Kuhn (1962). It follows from this definition that astronomy is a science because it studies celestial objects (such as moons, planets, stars, nebulae, and galaxies); that chemistry is a science because it studies the composition, properties and behaviour of matter; that psychology is a science because it studies the mental functions and behaviours of humans; that organisational studies is a science because it examines how organisational structures, processes, and practices shape social relations and influence performance; and at a stretch that even economics can be thought of as a science that studies the production, exchange, distribution, and consumption of goods and services.

According to this way of reasoning, *safety science* is the study of *safety*. But unlike the celestial objects, unlike matter, even unlike mental faculties, organisations, goods and services, *safety* does not represent an agreement on cannot what it is that should be studied, nor can it be said to exist in any concrete or material sense, or to be real (Westenhoff, 2011). Because of this we cannot resolve disputes about what safety is by referring to something that exists independently of our thinking of it, as if it was an object (as the term is used in semiotics). Yet we need to be able to refer to what *safety* is in a way that is open to intersubjective verifiability, we need to have a common agreement on what we should focus on, to avoid falling into the trap of solipsism.

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## 2. The definition of safety

Throughout the ages, the starting point for safety concerns has been the occurrence, potential or actual, of some kind of adverse outcome, whether it has been categorised as a risk, a hazard, a near miss, an incident, or an accident. Heinrich (1929), who by rights must be considered the pioneer of industrial safety, was careful to point out that a distinction should be made between accidents and injuries, where the former denoted the cause and the latter the effect. “There are major and minor injuries, of course, and it may be said that a major accident is one that produces a major injury. However, the accident and the injury are distinct occurrences; one is the result of the other, and in the continued use of the expression ‘major accident’, and in the acceptance of its definition as one that results seriously, there is a decided handicap to effective work” (Heinrich, 1929, p. 2). Later thinkers have, however, been less scrupulous in their use of the terminology, and the term safety has therefore been used to cover not only the injuries but also the events that lead to them.

Safety is often, indeed nearly always, defined as a condition where nothing goes wrong (injuries, accidents/incidents/near misses) or more cautiously as a condition where the number of things that go wrong is acceptably small. Examples of this definition are easy to find. The International Civil Aviation Organisation, for instance, defines safety as “the state in which harm to persons or of property damage is reduced to, and maintained at or below, an acceptable level through a continuing process of hazard identification and risk management” while the U.S. Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality defines safety as the “freedom from accidental injury”. More indirect definitions can also be found. As an example, Transport Safety Victoria defines a major incident as “an incident or natural event that poses a serious and immediate risk to safety and includes a derailment of rolling stock, a collision, a fire or explosion”. From this one may conclude that if accidents and incidents are a risk to safety, then safety is marked by the absence of accidents and incidents.

Such definitions of safety are, however, indirect rather than direct since safety is defined by what happens when it is absent or missing. Properly speaking, they are therefore definitions of lack of safety (or unsafety) rather than of safety. One consequence of this is that safety management relies on measurements that refer to the absence of safety rather than to the presence of safety. Because the focus is on things that go wrong, there will be something to measure when safety is absent, but paradoxically nothing to measure when safety is present. This has profound practical consequences for how safety is managed, but since that is far beyond the scope of this paper it will not be discussed further here.

The focus on situations where things go wrong, on the absence of safety, is theoretically and scientifically suspect but makes eminent practical sense. First of all because such situations may lead to unintended and unwanted injuries or harm in the form of loss of life and property, disrupted or inefficient performance, etc. Secondly because they usually happen unexpectedly and thereby are a constant reminder of how hard it is to create and maintain the orderly and predictable work environments that we desire so much – for psychological as well as practical reasons. Unexpected and unwanted events such as the collapse of a building or a bridge have been a typical concern in the classical safety thinking. Such concerns have presumably been an integral part of human activity at least since the agrarian revolution around 10–12,000 years ago and has been reinforced many times since. Closer to our time they came to the fore after the second industrial revolution, around 1750. The rapid mechanisation of work in the 19th century led to a growing number of hitherto unknown types of accidents, where the common factor was the breakdown, failure, or malfunctioning

of active technology. The mechanisation and industrialisation did not change the nature of the outcomes as such – still a loss of life, material, and property – but it increased the magnitude of the injuries. Hale and Hovden (1998) have characterised this as the age of technology, in which safety concerns focused on guarding machinery, stopping explosions and preventing structures from collapsing. The focus was the risks related to passive technology and structures such as buildings, bridges, and ships. (Petroski, 1992). Seeing technology as the predominant – and mostly also the only – source of both problems and solutions in safety was maintained with reasonable success until 1979, when the accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant (TMI) demonstrated that safeguarding technology was insufficient. The TMI accident forced safety professionals to consider the role of human factors – or even of *the* human factor – and made it necessary to include human failures and malfunctioning as potential risks, first in operation but later also in design, construction, and maintenance (Swain and Guttmann, 1983; Dougherty, 1990). In 1986, 7 years later, the loss of the space shuttle Challenger, together with the accident in Chernobyl, made yet another extension necessary. This time it was the influence of the organisation, captured by terms such as organisational failures (Reason, 1997) and safety culture (Guldenmund, 2000).

The history of safety contains several such transitions that occurred when the safety community found itself face to face with accidents that could not easily or comfortably be explained by the existing conceptual framework. In each case, new types of accidents have been accounted for by adding new types of causes (e.g., metal fatigue, ‘human error’, violations, organisational failure, and safety culture) to the previously existing catalogue. The general concern for safety management has always been to find a cause, or a set of causes, both in order to explain what has happened and in order to propose remedial actions. This way of thinking corresponds to a *causality credo*, which can be formulated as follows: (1) adverse outcomes (accidents, incidents, etc.) happen when something goes wrong; (2) adverse outcomes therefore have causes, which can be found, and (3) treating – and preferably eliminating – the causes will increase safety by preventing future accidents (e.g., Schröder-Hinrichs et al., 2012). An alternative approach would, of course, be to challenge or change the basic underlying assumption of causality, but few have entertained that. We have therefore through centuries become so accustomed to explaining accidents in terms of cause-effect relations – simple or compound – that we no longer notice it. And we cling tenaciously to this tradition, although it has become increasingly difficult to reconcile with reality.

### 2.1. Safety as an epiphenomenon

This way of defining safety indirectly, namely as that which is missing when something goes wrong, sees safety as an epiphenomenon rather than as a phenomenon. (An epiphenomenon is defined as an incidental product of some process, that has no effects of its own.) The primary phenomena are the adverse outcomes and how they come about, and safety is simply a name for the condition that exists when the adverse outcomes do not happen. In relation to the question addressed by this paper, the subject matter of *safety science* is therefore the occurrence – or rather, the non-occurrence – of adverse outcomes (accidents, incidents, and near misses) and their aetiology, but not safety as such. The subject matter is the lack of safety rather than safety. This raises the interesting question of whether it is possible to have a science about something that is not there? In other words, can the object of a science be nothing? (Lest the reader objects, philosophy can study the concept of nothing, but not nothing itself. *Ex nihilo nihil fit.*)

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