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Acceptance of evidence-supported hypotheses generates a stronger signal from an underlying functionally-connected network

J.C. Whitman^{a,*}, Y. Takane^{b,c}, T.P.L. Cheung^{d,e}, A. Moiseev^d, U. Ribary^{d,f}, L.M. Ward^{a,d}, T.S. Woodward^{d,g} 02

^a Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia, 2136 West Mall, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z4, Canada 4

^b Department of Psychology, University of Victoria, Canada 5

^c Department of Psychology, McGill University, Canada 6

7 ^d Behavioral & Cognitive Neuroscience Institute, Canada

8 e School of Engineering, Simon Fraser University, Canada

f Department of Psychology, Simon Fraser University, Canada 9

^g Department of Psychiatry, University of British Columbia, Canada 10

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Introduction 03

One cognitive function fundamental to human thought is choosing whether to accept a hypothesis. This underlies interpreting what you perceive, deciding how to act, and forming beliefs. When you judge a hypothesis, you will form a mental representation of how it relates to the available evidence. That mental representation or gestalt (Köhler, 1929: Metzger, 2006) should be more coherent and stable if the evidence 'fits' – in other words, if it supports the hypothesis being judged. This is demonstrated in how people are biased against evidence disconfirming their current beliefs (Buchy et al., 2007; Woodward et al., 2007), biased toward interpreting new evidence as being consistent with currently preferred interpretations (Whitman and Woodward, 2012), and generally biased toward gathering and perceiving evidence confirming their current opinions (Nickerson, 1998; Sanbonmatsu et al., 1998; Wason, 1960). The common theme across these findings is a cognitive bias favoring mental representations of ev-

5556idence-hypothesis matches. We propose that this bias stems from a fundamental organizational principle of how the brain operates: name-57ly, by forming connections between groups of neurons. Connections 5859 formed dynamically between the large sets of neurons underlying the

Corresponding author. Fax: +16048226923.

E-mail address: jenwhitman@gmail.com (J.C. Whitman).

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ABSTRACT

Choosing one's preferred hypothesis requires multiple brain regions to work in concert as a functionally connected network. We predicted that a stronger network signal would underlie cognitive coherence between 19 a hypothesis and the available evidence. In order to identify such functionally connected networks in magneto- 20 encephalography (MEG) data, we first localized the generators of changes in oscillatory power within three fre- 21 quency bands, namely alpha (7–13 Hz), beta (18–24 Hz), and theta (3–7 Hz), with a spatial resolution of 5 mm 22 and temporal resolution of 50 ms. We then used principal component analysis (PCA) to identify functionally con- $\frac{23}{23}$ nected networks reflecting co-varying post-stimulus changes in power. As predicted, PCA revealed a functionally 24 connected network with a stronger signal when the evidence supported accepting the hypothesis being judged. 25 This difference was driven by beta-band power decreases in the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), ven-26 tromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), and midline occipital cortex. 27

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mental representation of one concept (i.e. a hypothesis) and the sets 60 of neurons underlying the mental representations of other concepts 61 (i.e. items of evidence) would be easily supported by the brain's mech- 62 anisms for functional connectivity. Hence, we predicted that a match 63 between a hypothesis being judged and the available evidence - in 64 other words, greater cognitive coherence - should correspond to a 65 stronger signal from at least one underlying functionally connected 66 brain network.

In order to ask whether functionally connected network signals 68 grew stronger in response to evidence-hypothesis matches, we 69 analyzed the activity of brain networks while participants performed a 70 hypothesis judgment task. Brain activity was recorded via magnetoen-71 cephalography (MEG). MEG measures a real-time signal, similar to 72 that of the more widely used electroencephalography (EEG), but or-73 thogonal to it and less subject to spatial distortions (Herdman and 74 Cheyne, 2009). In the hypothesis judgment task, the available evidence 75 either supported accepting the hypothesis being judged (referred to 76 hereon as the focal hypothesis), or supported rejecting it in favor of an 77 alternative hypothesis. The focal and alternative hypotheses each 78 corresponded to a lake containing a mixture of black and white fish 79 (see Fig. 1). On each trial, a single black or white fish appeared in a 80 downstream lake. Participants had to judge the probability that it had 81 migrated there from the focal lake rather than the alternative lake. 82 They responded by using the buttons on a response box (right-handed) 83

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


Fig. 1. The hypothesis judgment task performed by participants. At the beginning of each trial, the participants were presented with two upstream lakes, each containing a mixture of black and white fish, and a third, empty downstream lake. A single fish, randomly selected to be either black or white, jumped within the downstream lake (jump duration was 140 ms). A Likert scale on a black background then appeared, with the text "definitely true" at the top end and "impossible" at the bottom end. In the example depicted here, the question next to the Likert scale asks the participant to rate their agreement with the statement that the "jumping *white* fish came from the *left*-hand lake rather than the *right*-hand lake. In that example, the left-hand lake is the *focal* hypothesis, while the right-hand lake is the *duentative* hypothesis. The participant thus correctly rejects the focal hypothesis. The color of the jumping fish (black or white) and the location of the lake corresponding to the focal hypothesis (left-hand vs. right-hand lake) were randomized across trials. Throughout each inter-trial interval, the Likert scale and black background disappeared, and each of the lakes was empty.

to move a cursor up or down a rating scale. This was an adaptation of a
paradigm described in our previously published work (Whitman,
Metzak, Lavigne, and Woodward, 2013). Our goal was to identify at
least one functionally connected network of brain regions displaying a
stronger signal when the evidence matched the focal hypothesis, and
the combined mental representation was thus more coherent.

In order to characterize functional networks underlying this task 90 with high spatial and temporal detail, we used a beamformer algorithm 91 to create whole-brain images of changes in oscillatory power. Use of 92beamformer algorithms to localize the cortical generators of oscillatory 93 94 signals in MEG data can produce brain maps with a level of spatial detail 95similar to those seen at the cluster level in functional magnetic reso-96 nance imaging (fMRI). We were able to produce one image for each suc-97 cessive 50 ms post-stimulus interval by using a sliding window to average across temporally overlapping estimates of oscillatory power. 98 99 This was done separately for three frequency ranges of interest, known as the alpha (7–13 Hz), beta (18 to 24 Hz), and theta (3–7 Hz) 100 frequency bands (Engel and Fries, 2010; Kelly et al., 2006; Wu et al., 101 2007), and separately for each experimental condition of interest: 102whether evidence supported or refuted the focal hypothesis. Each 103 104 beamformed image represented activity combined across trials within 105a given condition. We then assessed how changes in the power of cortical oscillations covaried over time between brain regions and frequency 106bands. To this purpose, we used principal component analysis (PCA) to 107identify, in an efficient and data-driven manner, the dominant brain 108 109networks defined by shared time courses of post-stimulus changes in oscillatory power. PCA analyzes a matrix of covariances or correlations 110 between variable values (in this case spectral power in a specific fre-111 quency band at each voxel) into orthogonal components, with each 112 component accounting for part of the pattern of covariances (Jolliffe, 113 1986). 114

We expected the brain networks involved in performing the hypothesis judgment task to include regions of the dorsal attention, vision, and frontoparietal control networks (Yeo et al., 2011) with strong contributions from parietal and lateral occipital cortices, as was found in our previous fMRI study of hypothesis judgment (Whitman et al., 2013a, Q4 2013b). We also predicted that the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 120 (DLPFC), reported to be involved in perceptual decision-making 121 (Heekeren et al., 2004; Heekeren et al., 2006; Kim and Shadlen, 1999), 122 might figure prominently. While the left DLPFC did not figure prominently in our previous fMRI study, its role may be more evident in the 124 MEG data, which involve real-time measures with a much higher temporal resolution than fMRI.

The examination of oscillations in several distinct frequency bands 127 may also reveal effects not detectable by fMRI. The power of cortical os- 128 cillations in several characteristic frequency bands is known to vary as a 129 function of several cognitive factors. There is an extensive literature on 130 how the power of alpha-band oscillations over parietal and occipital re- 131 gions varies with spatial attention (Kelly et al., 2006; Rihs et al., 2007; 05 Sauseng et al., 2005a, 2005b; Worden et al., 2000), and literature on 133 the role of theta-band oscillations in central executive functions, work- 134 ing memory, and task switching (Sauseng et al., 2010; Sauseng et al., Q6 2005a, 2005b; Schack et al., 2005; Wu et al., 2007). Changes in beta- 136 band power in motor cortex contralateral to a hand being moved 137 are associated with motor activity (Pfurtscheller et al., 1996; 138 Pfurtscheller et al., 2003). Beta-band oscillations in multiple brain re- 139 gions, including prefrontal and parietal cortices, are associated with in- 140 sightful problem-solving and perceptual decision-making (Donner 141 et al., 2009; Sheth et al., 2009; Siegel et al., 2011). We predicted that a 142 functionally connected brain network, involving changes in oscillatory 143 power covarying across at least some of the brain regions specified 144 above, and potentially also covarying across frequency bands, would ex- 145 hibit a stronger signal when the evidence supported accepting the focal 146 hypothesis. 147

Materials and methods

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Ethics approval for all experiments reported here was obtained from 149 the UBC Clinical Research Ethics Board and the Vancouver Coastal 150

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