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Sunk costs in the human brain

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Introduction

According to traditional economic theory, rational decision-making should be based on current and future costs and benefits associated with the available alternatives (Bernoulli, 1954; Frank and Bernanke, 2006). Past costs that have already been incurred and cannot be recovered, however, should be ignored when making decisions about present investments. Nevertheless, people are frequently influenced by previous investments in their decision-making, succumbing to a cognitive bias known as the 'sunk cost' effect (Arkes and Avton, 1999: Arkes and Blumer, 1985). Although the sunk cost effect often leads to adverse financial (McNamara et al., 2002), political (Staw, 1976), or personal consequences (Strube, 1988), its neurobiological underpinnings are largely unknown.

Recent years have seen rapid advances in understanding how decision processes are implemented in the brain (Blakemore and Robbins, 2012; Grabenhorst and Rolls, 2011; Kable and Glimcher, 2009; Rangel et al., 2008). Neurophysiological and neuroimaging studies identified a large network of brain areas relevant for decision-making, including the ventral striatum, the amygdala, the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), and the parietal cortex (de Martino et al., 2006; Hare et al., 2008; Hunt et al., 2012; Platt and Glimcher, 1999). However, in particular the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and the ventromedial prefrontal

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ABSTRACT

Rational decision-making should not be influenced by irrecoverable past costs. Human beings, however, often violate this basic rule of economics and take 'sunk' costs into account when making decisions about current or future investments, thus exhibiting a so-called 'sunk cost effect'. Although the sunk cost effect may have serious 18 political, financial or personal consequences, its neural basis is largely unknown. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and a novel financial decision-making task, we show here that previous investments re- 20 duced the contribution of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) to current decision-making and that this 21 reduction in vmPFC activity correlated with the sunk cost effect. Moreover, activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal 22 cortex (dIPFC) was associated with the norm not to waste resources and negatively correlated with vmPFC activity. The present findings show how past investments may bias decision-making in the human brain, suggesting 24 that the interaction of vmPFC and dlPFC may promote a tendency to throw good money after bad.

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cortex (vmPFC) are thought to integrate the various dimensions of an 53 option and to compute expected value or utility (Grabenhorst and 54 Rolls, 2011; Kable and Glimcher, 2009; Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 55 2006; Schwabe et al., 2012; Valentin et al., 2007) that is central in eco- 56 nomic and psychological decision theories (Kahneman and Tversky, 57 1979; von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944). Here, we set out to examine how past investments change the contribution of these areas to 59 decision-making and, thus, to characterize the brain mechanisms un- 60 derlying the sunk cost effect.

To this end, we collected functional magnetic resonance images 62 (fMRI) while participants performed a novel financial decision-making 63 task in which they first had to decide whether to invest a certain 64 amount of money in a project and were then asked whether they 65 wanted to make additional investments that would be required to con- 66 tinue the project. According to economic theory, the initial investment 67 decision and the decision to make further investments should be inde- 68 pendent. Furthermore, the decision whether to continue a project or 69 not should be unaffected by the amount of previous investments but 70 only be influenced by the expected value of the current decision alterna-71 tives. We predicted, however, that current decision-making would be 72 biased by past investment decisions and that this bias would be depen- 73 dent on the amount that has already been invested. We further predict- 74 ed that this sunk cost effect would be mediated by reduced activity in 75 prefrontal areas that are implicated in expected value representation. 76 Moreover, based on previous behavioral data (Arkes and Ayton, 1999), 77 we expected that the tendency to consider sunk costs in current 78 decision-making would be related to the individual norm not to waste 79 resources and that this norm would be represented by brain areas that 80

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have been implicated in rule based control before, such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dIPFC; Koechlin and Summerfield, 2007).

Methods

Behavioral pilot studies

The task described below was first tested in two consecutive behavioral pilot studies. In the first pilot study, 12 healthy, young participants (6 men, 6 women; age range: 18 to 32 years) completed a task version that differed from the task that was finally used in the fMRI study in the probabilities of success (low probability of 25% vs. high probability of 75%) Because these parameters resulted only in limited behavioral variability, we ran a second pilot study, in which 15 healthy participants (7 men, 8 women; age range: 18 to 32 years) were tested and in which the investment task was used with exactly the same parameters as described below ("Investment task").

fMRI study

Participants

Twenty-eight healthy, right-handed volunteers with normal or corrected-to-normal vision and without a history of any psychiatric or neurologic disorders participated in this experiment (15 women; mean age = 24.8 years, age range: 20–31 years). All participants gave written informed consent and were paid for their participation. The study was approved by the Institutional Review Board of the Ruhr-University Bochum.

Investment task

During fMRI scanning, participants performed 324 trials of an investment task. On each trial, they were presented a project that was characterized by its costs and probability of success (Fig. 1). The project costs were 0.20 Euros (low) or 0.55 Euros (high) and the probability of success was 40% (low), 50% (medium), or 60% (high). These stated probabilities of success corresponded exactly to those success probabilities that were actually implemented in the trials. Behavioral pilot studies (see "Behavioral pilot studies") showed that these parameters resulted

in sufficient variability in investment decisions. Participants had 5 s to 113 decide whether they wanted to invest the requested amount in the 114 given project or not by pressing the corresponding button on a response 115 box; the location of the "invest" and "do not invest" responses on the 116 screen varied randomly across participants. If they did not respond 117 within 5 s or decided not to invest in the project, the trial was aborted. 118 However, if participants decided to invest in the project, they received 119 either the immediate feedback that the project was successful or not 120 (according to the given probability of success) or they were informed 121 that further investments would be required. In this latter case, partici- 122 pants were next shown the additional costs that would be required 123 and the current probability of success. The additional costs could again 124 be 0.20 Euros or 0.55 Euros and the probability of success could again 125 be 40, 50, or 60%, thus the only difference between the decision scenar- 126 ios for the initial investment and the follow-up investment was whether 127 or not participants had already invested in the project. Again, partici- 128 pants had 5 s to decide whether to invest the additional costs or 129 whether to stop the project. If participants invested the additional 130 costs, they received immediate feedback on the success of the project, 131 i.e., there was at maximum one follow-up investment. If the participants 132 decided not to invest the additional costs, the trial was aborted.

Each of the six trial types that resulted from the different combinations of project costs (low vs. high) and probability of success (low vs. 135 medium vs. high) was presented 54 times. In order to make sure that 136 there was a sufficient number of trials in which the influence of prior investments on current investment decisions could be tested (i.e., in 138 which participants had decided to invest), two-thirds of all trials were 139 'follow-up trials'. In these trials, participants were informed that 140 follow-up investments would be required after they had decided to 141 make the initial investment. These follow-up trials were further 142 subdivided into those in which a low initial investment (0.20 Euros) 143 had been made and those in which participants had already invested a 144 high amount of money (0.50 Euros). Apart from the previous invest- 145 ment, 'no prior investment trials', 'low prior investment trials', and 146 'high prior investment trials' were identical; all possible costs \times probability combinations were presented equally often in these trials. The in- 148 clusion of low- and high-prior investment trials has the advantage that 149 possible effects of the amount of prior investment on decision-making 150




Fig. 1. The investment task. In each trial, participants were presented a project that was characterized by its costs (low vs. high) and probability of success (low vs. medium vs. high). Subjects should decide whether they wanted to invest the requested amount of money in the project or not. If they made the investment, they received either immediate feedback about the project's success (no prior investment trial) or were told that further investments would be required and had to decide whether to invest the additional costs or not (low- and high prior investment trials). The no-, low-, and high prior investment trials differed only in whether and how much participants had already invested in the project.

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