



Evaluating the 2014 retroactive regulatory framework applied to the grid connected PV systems in Spain



Jordi de la Hoz^{a,*}, Helena Martín^a, Jaume Miret^b, Miguel Castilla^b, Ramon Guzman^c

^a Department of Electrical Engineering, Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya (UPC), Escola Universitària d'Enginyeria Tècnica Industrial de Barcelona (EUETIB), Carrer del Comte d'Urgell, 187, 08036 Barcelona, Spain

^b Department of Electronic Engineering, Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya (UPC), Escola Politècnica Superior d'Enginyeria de Vilanova i la Geltrú (EPSEVG), Av. Víctor Balaguer, 1, 08800 Vilanova i la Geltrú, Spain

^c Department of Automatic Control, Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya (UPC), Escola Politècnica Superior d'Enginyeria de Vilanova i la Geltrú (EPSEVG), Av. Víctor Balaguer, 1, 08800 Vilanova i la Geltrú, Spain

HIGHLIGHTS

- Analysis of the RD 413/2014 new economic and regulatory framework for GCPVS.
- Description and formulation of the new remuneration scheme.
- The simplified model proposed is able to identify the most influential regulatory parameters.
- The economic indicators of the undertaken case study reveal a substantial lost in profitability.

ARTICLE INFO

Article history:

Received 18 November 2015
Received in revised form 16 February 2016
Accepted 17 February 2016

Keywords:

Renewable energy
Retroactivity
Photovoltaic
Regulations
Spain
Feed in tariff (FIT)

ABSTRACT

The RD 413/2014 new economic and regulatory framework for producers of electricity from renewable energy sources in Spain has been here analysed, putting the focus on its impact on the economic results of the existing grid connected PV systems. A complete formulation of the new remuneration scheme is first presented, making evident its high complexity and the great number of regulatory parameters involved. Then, in order to facilitate the discernment of its operating mechanism a simplified model is proposed. This approach has proven to be a useful tool to identify the most influential regulatory parameters and also which could be the plausible future regulatory actions in order to contain the cost to the Spanish Electricity System. Finally, the NPV and the IRR among other indicators are calculated for a representative case study facility, evidencing a substantial profitability reduction in the transition from the former economic and regulatory framework to the RD 413/2014 new remuneration scheme.

© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

From early 2000s, the renewable energy policy of the European Union (EU) has boosted the electricity from renewable energy sources (RES-E) throughout Europe [1,2]. As a result, in the recent period 2011–2013 at least three EU countries (Germany, Spain and Italy) were among the top 5 performers in the world with highest rates of renewable capacity per capita (excluding hydropower) [3–6]. Moreover, in the case of photovoltaic (PV) capacity, these good results were even better. Since 2006, the EU has accounted for

more than half of the total worldwide PV capacity. Once again, at the top of the PV global rank in 2013 were Germany (35,715 MW), Italy (17,928 MW) and Spain (5,340 MW).

All the countries occupying the first positions in the PV promotion had adopted the feed-in-tariff (FIT) mechanism [3–7]. Notwithstanding the excellent results achieved, the fact remains that the FIT has been blamed for some malfunctions in the electricity sectors of the implementing countries. One of the most important malfunctions was the so called “call for inversion” effect, responsible for the exponential growth of the PV capacity and the cause of the overrun cost to the electricity systems of these countries.

Despite these malfunctions the FIT mechanism continues to be used and, consequently, is one of the key elements analysed in the scientific literature of the last years. For example, attention has

* Corresponding author at: Department of Electrical Engineering, Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya (UPC), Escola Universitària d'Enginyeria Tècnica Industrial de Barcelona (EUETIB), Carrer del Comte d'Urgell, 187, 08036 Barcelona, Spain. Tel.: +34 934 137 319; fax: +34 934 137 401.

E-mail address: jordi.de.la.hoz@upc.edu (J. de la Hoz).

Acronyms

RD	Royal Decree	$Nh_{i,j}$	standard equivalent operating hours within the year i of j (h)
EU	European Union	Nh_{ei}	standard equivalent operating hours for the year i under the regulatory frameworks prior to RD 413/2014
FIT	feed-in tariff	Nh_{inst_i}	number of equivalent operating hours within the year i (h)
GCPVS	grid connected photovoltaic systems	$Nh_{max_{(Ro)_i}}$	maximum value of Nh_{inst_i} eligible for perceiving the Ro_i (h)
IRR	Internal Rate of Return	Nh_{min_i}	minimum value of Nh_{inst_i} that does not entail a reduction of $SR_{Revenue_i}$ (h)
MO	Ministerial Order	Op_{R_i}	the remuneration for the operation in the year i (€)
NPV	Net Present Value	$Operating_Cost_i$	total cost for running the facility (€)
PV	photovoltaic	p	first complete year of j
RDL	Royal Decree-Law	P_{peak}	installed capacity of the PV panels, considered at the inverter DC input (MW _p)
RES-E	electricity from renewable energy sources	P_n	nominal power, considered at the inverter AC output (MW)
SES	Spanish Electricity Sector	Pm_i	yearly average energy market price per unit of generated energy in the year i (€/MW h)
SR	Specific Retribution	Pmf_i	estimated future market price per unit of generated energy for the year i (€/MW h)
Variables			
a	the year in which the operating permit is obtained	Pm_{ei}	revenue per unit of generated energy from the energy sales in the year i under the regulatory frameworks prior to RD 413/2014 (€/MW h)
$C_{j,a}$	coefficient representing the investment cost of a GCPVS obtaining the operating permit in the year a that cannot be recovered with the market revenue within j	$Revenue_i$	total revenue perceived in the year i (€)
$Cexp_i$	standard mean total operating cost for $i < p$ per unit of installed power (€/MW)	$Rinv_{j,a}$	remuneration for the investment per unit of installed power for every year i within j of a GCPVS obtaining the operating permit in the year a (€/MW)
$Cexpf_i$	future estimated cost per unit of installed power within the year i (€/MW)	Ro_i	the remuneration for the operation per unit of generated energy in the year i (€/MW h)
C_{Eexpf_i}	standard operating cost per unit of generated energy in the year i (€/MW h)	sm	number of years of j
$C_{Eexp_{ei}}$	standard operating cost per unit of generated energy in the year i under the regulatory frameworks prior to RD 413/2014 (€/MW h)	SB_j	average yield during determined period of the 10-year Spanish bonds in the secondary market within j
$C_{Eexp_{real_i}}$	real operating cost per unit of energy (€/MW h)	$SR_{Revenue_i}$	SR revenue perceived in the year i (€)
d_i	coefficient correcting the annual revenue according to Nh_{inst_i}	t_j	per unit discount rate within j corresponding to the reasonable profitability
E_i	total energy generated within the year i (MW h)	Uf_i	threshold of Nh_{inst_i} for perceiving $SR_{Revenue_i}$
$EBITDA_i$	earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization of the GCPVS in the year i (€)	$Vajdm_{i,j}$	coefficient adjusting the deviations of Pm_i
E_{max_i}	maximum value of E_i eligible for perceiving the Ro_i (MW h)	$VNA_{j,a}$	net value per unit of installed power within j of a GCPVS obtaining the operating permit in the year a (€/MW)
Ing_i	standard mean total income for $i < p$ per unit of installed power (€/MW)	VR_j	remaining number of years at the beginning of j to the end of the facility VU (years)
$Ingf_i$	future estimated operating income per unit of installed power within the year i (€/MW)	VI_a	standard value of the initial GCPVS investment per unit of installed power (€/MW)
Inv_{R_i}	the remuneration for the investment in the year i (€)	VU	regulatory lifetime (years)
j	three-year half-period	ΔC_{Eexpf_i}	differential over C_{Eexpf_i} (€/MW h)
K_j	capital recovery factor	Δt_j	basis points differential added to SB_j for determining t_j
K_R	the yearly degradation rate (%)		
LR	reasonable profitability level		
$LI1_{i,j}, LI2_{i,j}$	lower limits for the calculation of $Vajdm_{i,j}$		
$LS1_{i,j}, LS2_{i,j}$	upper limits for the calculation of $Vajdm_{i,j}$		
$Market_Revenue_i$	market revenue perceived in the year i (€)		

recently been focused on the FIT for promoting RES-E in the United Kingdom as a vehicle towards to a low carbon transition, reviewing again the pros and cons of this mechanism, specially its inherent boost effect [8–11]. As well, concerning the effectiveness of the FIT mechanism in avoiding CO₂ emissions, it is possible to find recent studies related to countries such as Germany, Taiwan, Malaysia or Australia [12–15]. The German experience has also been used as a reference for comparing the German FIT against other promotion mechanisms [16], and for countries such as Japan and Kenya, the prospects of the evolution of the grid connected PV systems (GCPVS) have been analysed taking into account the FIT mechanism in their models [17,18]. Likewise, when analysing dif-

ferent values and grades of support to energy storage systems facilitating the large-scale the integration of wind energy, the FIT mechanism has been praised as an effective tool [19,20].

Nevertheless, two new regulatory trends appeared in the countries that applied FIT mechanisms and experienced a power capacity boom far exceeding their policy objectives, especially for GCPVS. The first of these trends was the introduction of limiting regulatory elements for the new facilities to be installed [21]. Spain, which due to the malfunction of the FIT mechanism led the PV market in 2008 [22], was one of the first countries that introduced these modifications in the international context [23]. In this regard, Italy, the second country in the PV global rank in

Download English Version:

<https://daneshyari.com/en/article/6683446>

Download Persian Version:

<https://daneshyari.com/article/6683446>

[Daneshyari.com](https://daneshyari.com)