Accepted Manuscript

Local signals and the returns to foreign education

Massimiliano Tani

 PII:
 S0272-7757(16)30645-8

 DOI:
 10.1016/j.econedurev.2017.07.006

 Reference:
 ECOEDU 1724

To appear in: Economics of Education Review

Received date:27 November 2016Revised date:14 July 2017Accepted date:14 July 2017

Please cite this article as: Massimiliano Tani, Local signals and the returns to foreign education, *Economics of Education Review* (2017), doi: 10.1016/j.econedurev.2017.07.006

This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof before it is published in its final form. Please note that during the production process errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain.



Local signals and the returns to foreign education

JEL classification: J24, J61, J70 Keywords: immigration, foreign education, statistical discrimination

Massimiliano Tani

School of Business UNSW Canberra Northcott Drive, Campbell ACT 2612 Email: m.tani@adfa.edu.au / m.tani@unsw.edu.au Tel: +61 2 6268 8843

1. Introduction

There is common evidence that labour markets do not recognise foreign education in the same way as that acquired domestically even when immigrants are selected on the basis of their human capital, as in Australia, Canada and New Zealand. The wage penalty associated to foreign schooling can be substantial (Sweetman, 2004; Chiswick and Miller, 2008), as is the probability of ending up in a job that requires a lower level of education than the one possessed (McGuinness, 2006; Green et al, 2007; Wald and Fang, 2008; Poot and Stillman, 2007; Chiswick and Miller, 2009).

Although the penalty decreases with time spent in the host country, the causes of its emergence have been attributed to two broad competing explanations. The first suggests that foreign education is less transferable than the one acquired domestically because it is country-specific (Duleep and Regets, 1997 and 2002) or has lower quality (Bratsberg and Terrell, 2002; Betts and Lofstrom, 2000; Sweetman, 2004; Chiswick and Miller, 2010). The alternative explanation suggests that foreign education provides an imprecise signal of productivity, leading host country employers to offer wages that penalize individuals' qualifications in favour of group indicators of human capital, causing migrants to be 'statistically discriminated' (Farber and Gibbson, 1996; Altonji and Pierret, 2001; Lange, 2007).

Download English Version:

https://daneshyari.com/en/article/6840833

Download Persian Version:

https://daneshyari.com/article/6840833

Daneshyari.com