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11 Optimization of dialoctical outcomes in dialogical 11 $\frac{11}{12}$ Optimization of dialectical outcomes in dialogical $\frac{11}{12}$ 13 13 argumentation ✩

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20 20 21 ANTICLE INTO \overline{A} by TRACI A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

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22 $\overline{ }$ $\overline{ }$ 23 Received 14 September 2015 **and so the audience may be uncertain as to the structure of the argument graph as** ²⁴ Received in revised form 29 June 2016 intended by the presenter of the arguments. For a presenter of arguments, it is useful ²⁴ 25 Accepted 30 June 2016
Analytic enterprise to know the audience's argument graph, but the presenter may be uncertain as to the 25 26 Avallable online xxxx
26 Structure of it. To model the uncertainty as to the structure of the argument graph in $\frac{27}{\text{Kewords}}$ $\frac{27}{\text{Kewords}}$ situations such as these, we can use probabilistic argument graphs. The set of subgraphs of $\frac{27}{\text{Kewords}}$ ²⁸ Abstract argumentation **being the same of the sample space.** A probability value is assigned to each subgraph such ²⁸ 29 29 that the sum is 1, thereby reflecting the uncertainty over which is the actual subgraph. 30 30 We can then determine the probability that a particular set of arguments is included or 31 excluded from an extension according to a particular Dung semantics. We represent and 31 excluded from an extension according to a particular Dung semantics. We represent and 31 32 32 reason with extensions from a graph and from its subgraphs, using a *logic of dialectical* 33 33 *outcomes* that we present. We harness this to define the notion of an *argumentation lottery*, ³⁴ be used by the presenter to decide which arguments to present by choosing those that ³⁴ 35 35 maximize expected utility. We investigate some of the options for using argumentation 36 36 lotteries, and provide a computational evaluation. which can be used by the audience to determine the expected utility of a debate, and can

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42 42 **1. Introduction**

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₄₄ **144** Computational models of argument aim to reflect how human argumentation uses conflicting information to construct 45 Computational models of digital tank to reflect now handled a gaineration ases connecting information to construct $_{\rm 46}$ and analyze arguments. There is a number of frameworks for computational models of argumentation. They incorporate a $_{\rm 46}$ $_{47}$ formal representation of individual arguments and techniques for comparing conflicting arguments (for reviews see [\[9,13\]\)](#page--1-0). $_{47}$

 $_{48}$ $\;$ In abstract argumentation, a graph is used to represent a set of arguments and counterarguments. Each node is an argu- $_{48}$ 49 49 ment and each arc from an argument *α* to an argument *β* denotes an attack by *α* on *β*. It is a well-established and intuitive $_{50}$ approach to modelling argumentation, and it offers a valuable starting point for theoretical analysis of argumentation [\[26\].](#page--1-0) $_{\rm 50}$ 51 51 However, including an argument *α* in a graph usually means that one is sure that *α* is a *justifiable* argument, i.e., that it is ₅₂ an argument that makes sense (independently of whether it can be *accepted* after relating it to other arguments). Abstract 52 ₅₃ argumentation does not explicitly consider whether (or to what degree) an argument is believed to be justifiable or whether 53

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 56 \quad $^{\circ}$ This is an extended version of A. Hunter, M. Thimm, Probabilistic argument graphs for argumentation lotteries, in: Computational Models of Argument, 56 57 57 COMMA'14, IOS Press, 2014.

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1 1 (or to what degree) an attack by an argument is believed to justifiable. It only represents the existence of arguments and 2 2 counterarguments in a strict manner.

 3 To address the need to represent and reason with (quantified) uncertainty, it has been proposed to use a probability 4 assignment to arguments and to attacks [\[12\].](#page--1-0) This can be used to give a probability distribution over the subgraphs of the 5 argument graph, and this can then be used to give a probability assignment for a set of arguments being an admissible ⁶ set or extension of the argument graph [\[49,42,45\].](#page--1-0) The probability distribution over subgraphs denotes the uncertainty over 7 which subgraph is the actual graph that should be used. We refer to an argument graph with a probability distribution over $^{\rm 7}$ 8 subgraphs as a *probabilistic argument graph*.

⁹ Consider a typical argumentation scenario for persuasion [\[70,11\],](#page--1-0) i.e., a scenario where one or more agents are present-¹⁰ ing arguments in front of an audience, with the aim of each participant being to persuade the audience to adopt a certain ¹⁰ ¹¹ statement. We assume that each participant and the audience have some argument graph in mind but are willing to in-¹² corporate new arguments and attacks into it. In this context, we believe the following are two important applications for ¹² 13 13 probabilistic argument graphs:

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15 15 • **From an audience's perspective**, there may be uncertainty as to what the actual argument graph is. The audience may ¹⁶ hear various comments in a debate, for example, but they are not sure about the exact set of arguments and attacks ¹⁶ ¹⁷ that are being put forward. For instance, there may be uncertainty about whether someone has put forward a complex ¹⁷ 18 18 multifaceted argument, or a number of smaller more focused arguments or there may doubt about whether some 19 19 arguments are just rephrasings of previous arguments. There may be uncertainty about which arguments are meant 20 20 to be attacked by some argument, which occurs frequently when enthymemes (incomplete arguments) are presented. ²¹ So the audience can collate all the candidates for arguments and attacks, and construct the graph containing them all, ²¹ 22 22 and then identify a probability distribution over its subgraphs that reflects their uncertainty about which is the actual 23 23 graph.

24 24 • **From a participant's perspective** (i.e. from the perspective of someone who is about to present arguments and/or ²⁵ attacks to some monological or dialogical argumentation), there may be uncertainty about what the audience regards ²⁵ 26 26 as the argument graph. When a participant (such as a politician) considers presenting arguments to an audience, the 27 27 participant might not know for sure which arguments and attacks the audience has in mind. In other words, even 28 before a participant has started, the audience may already have an argument graph in mind and the participant will 28 29 29 be adding to that graph in the audience's mind. To handle this, the participant may have an argument graph which ³⁰he/she assumes will subsume the possibilities for the argument graph held by the audience, and then the participant ³⁰ ³¹ 31 might identify a probability distribution over subgraphs of the argument graph to reflect the uncertainty as judged by 32 32 the participant over which is the subgraph being used by the audience.

³⁴ In this paper we investigate the use of probabilistic argument graphs as the underlying knowledge representation formal- ³⁴ ³⁵ ism in dialogical argumentation scenarios. Besides the rich expressivity of probabilistic argument graphs, this formalism can ³⁵ ³⁶ also be used for the problem of rational action selection, i.e., which arguments to disclose in order to maximize the utility ³⁶ 37 of the result of the dialogue. As we will see, we can utilize probabilistic argument graphs to determine the probability of 37 38 38 possible outcomes of an argument graph.

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³⁹ We define these outcomes as formulae of an expressive logic of dialectical outcomes for reasoning about subgraphs and ³⁹ 40 40 extensions of argument graphs. This logic allows the representation of complex statements about argument graphs—such as ⁴¹ "there is a subgraph of the graph where all preferred extensions contain either α or β "—and can thus be used to represent ⁴¹ ⁴² desired outcomes and means to reach them. For probabilistic argument graphs, we can determine the probability of those ⁴² ⁴³ formulae. From an audience's perspective, this gives a better understanding of the consequences of the debate that they ⁴³ ⁴⁴ are observing, and from a participant's perspective, it gives a better understanding of whether s/he will get the desired ⁴⁴ 45 45 outcomes from his/her contributions to the argumentation.

 46 We further exploit probabilistic argument graphs, by introducing the notion of *lotteries* for argumentation. Lotteries are ⁴⁷ an important approach to decision-making with uncertainty. In a lottery, there are a number of outcomes, and probability ⁴⁷ ⁴⁸ associated with each of them. For example, if we buy a lottery ticket for 1 Euro, with the prize being 500 Euros, and there ⁴⁸ 49 are 1000 tickets, then we have the outcome "win" with the probability 1*/*1000 and the outcome "lose" with a probability 50 of 999*/*1000. We can then measure the utility of each outcome. For instance, the utility of "win" could be 500 for the prize 51 minus 1 for the cost of entering (i.e. net utility is 499), and the utility of "lose" is −1. The expected utility of buying the 52 ticket is then $(499 \times 1/1000) + (-1 \times 999/1000)$ is $-1/2$ Euro, whereas the expected utility of not buying the ticket is 52 53 0 Euro, which suggests it is not a good decision to buy the ticket.

⁵⁴ Assume that during a discussion, a debater wants to identify a good argument to bring into the discussion and that the ⁵⁴ 55 55 audience of the discussion is considering some subgraph of *G* as the *true* argument graph. The debater does not know for ⁵⁶ sure which subgraph is the correct one but he can identify a probability distribution over the subgraphs. Now, suppose he ⁵⁶ ⁵⁷ is keen that arguments α and β are accepted by the audience (e.g. they are both in the grounded extension of whichever ⁵⁷ 58 58 subgraph the audience is using). So the outcome we want is that *α* and *β* are included in the grounded extension. If this 59 59 is not possible, then perhaps he wants the outcome where *α* is included and *β* excluded. Suppose any other outcome is 60 inferior to these two outcomes. By using the probabilistic argument graphs, we are able to determine a probability for $\,$ 60 61 each of these outcomes, and we can construct a lottery containing these arguments. If we identify a utility function over 61 Download English Version:

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