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Truthfulness in Advertising? Approximation Mechanisms for Knapsack Bidders

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Highlights

- We analyze truthful mechanisms for bidders who have knapsack utility functions.
- Such non-quasilinear utility functions have been reported in advertising markets.
- In our offline model, we provide a mechanism with a 4-approximation.
- The results highlight model assumptions allowing for truthfulness-in-expectation.

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