

Accepted Manuscript

Supplier encroachment under nonlinear pricing with imperfect substitutes: Bargaining power versus revenue-sharing

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PII: S0377-2217(17)31160-8
DOI: [10.1016/j.ejor.2017.12.027](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2017.12.027)
Reference: EOR 14886



To appear in: *European Journal of Operational Research*

Received date: 17 May 2017
Revised date: 11 December 2017
Accepted date: 18 December 2017

Please cite this article as: Huixiao Yang , Jianwen Luo , Qinhong Zhang , Supplier encroachment under nonlinear pricing with imperfect substitutes: Bargaining power versus revenue-sharing, *European Journal of Operational Research* (2017), doi: [10.1016/j.ejor.2017.12.027](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2017.12.027)

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Highlights

- *Nonlinear pricing* coupled with *Revenue-sharing* can coordinate the chain.
- Further increase of direct sales cost and product substitution can profit both firms.
- An encroaching supplier always hurts the retailer, even without direct sales.
- A less powerful supplier is more likely to benefit from encroachment.
- A powerful and relatively efficient supplier hurts from the threat of encroaching.

ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

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