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Sustaining Cooperation in a Differential Game of Advertising Goodwill Accumulation

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Highlights

- The paper studies a three-player differential game with an infinite time horizon
- We identify the characteristic functions of all feasible coalitions
- We show how cooperation in the grand coalition can be sustained over time
- The paper applies the concept of the core to a dynamic game



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