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A Game Theoretic Model for Resource Allocation Among Countermeasures With Multiple Attributes

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Highlights

- A counter-terrorism game is defined with multi-attribute utilities for both players
- Extends existing games to include multiple countermeasures, targets and attack types
- A case study illustrates optimal allocation of defensive resources
- Equilibrium results show which attacker's utility function is worst for defender
- Equilibrium results show when attacker will be indifferent between multiple attacks

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