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Contract Designs for Energy-saving Product Development in a Monopoly

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Highlights

- We study two types of contracts (fixed amount and price discount) for a budget-constrained government.
- We capture the firm's response to the contracts in terms of pricing and product design.
- We consider two types of environmental performance and show that they have the same effect on contract designs.
- The impacts of the budget and consumers' environmental awareness are explored.
- No contract type is always dominating or dominated.

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