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Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective

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RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS

- We review recent advances in auction theory from a game theoretic perspective.
- We consider estimation issues and the effect of asymmetry on bidding.
- We examine how auctions are embedded in the market.
- We investigate bidding when players break the rules.
- We expand the perspective by incorporating irrationality in bidding.

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