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Q1 Causal attribution in explanations of near-crash events behind the wheel, 2 and its relationship to comparative judgments

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8 A B S T R A C T

Introduction: The development of skills essential for avoiding crashes depends, in part, on how drivers explain the causes of dangerous driving behaviors that resulted in a near crash. This study analyzes causes attributed to such behaviors by car drivers in a self-report study. We explore the relationships between the dimensions of causal attribution, attribution of responsibility for the near crash, and drivers' comparative judgments. *Method:* For approximately two months, 154 drivers (age 23 to 77 years, including 72 females) used logbooks to document the near crashes that occurred during their trips. The causes attributed in those reports to driving behaviors resulting in near crashes were then coded by two judges on the basis of several causal dimensions. Drivers also estimated their own and an average driver's skill levels, and their risk of being involved, as a driver, in a crash. *Results:* We distinguished four main types of causes of the 167 near crashes reported. Drivers had a tendency to more often attribute external causes to their own behaviors resulting in near crashes than to those of others. The probability of attributing a controllable cause increased with overestimation of one's own skills and decreased with underestimation of one's own risk in comparison to other drivers. The probability of attributing a stable cause increased with underestimation of one's own risk. *Conclusions:* When they explained their own behaviors resulting in near crashes, drivers mentioned different types of causes than when they explained those of others. Overestimation of one's own skills as compared to other drivers could be beneficial for developing crash-avoiding skills, insofar as it seems to foster attribution of controllable causes. By contrast, underestimation of one's own risk could have the opposite effect. *Practical applications:* Vulnerability to road risks should be stressed in driver's training and risk communication campaigns. However, self-confidence with respect to one's skills should not always be targeted as a safety problem.

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1. Introduction

Driving a car consists of maintaining the speed needed to reach a destination within a desired time period, while keeping at a safe distance from stationary or moving entities in the road environment, in accordance with current road conditions (Summala, 1997). The driver regulates his/her activity according to the perceived level of task difficulty (Fuller, McHugh, & Pender, 2008), which depends, in particular, on driving experience (Delhomme, 1995). Near crashes, that is, interactions where safety margins are narrowed so that feelings of danger emerge, are crucial moments for the development of the skills essential to avoiding crashes (Fuller, 1984; Näätänen & Summala, 1976). It is therefore important to analyze the ways car drivers explain behaviors that lead to near crashes, in order to gain further knowledge about the factors that can facilitate or hamper the development of

these skills. In the following paragraphs, we first expose a theoretical background useful for analyzing how individuals attribute causes to behaviors. Then we describe a socio-psychological phenomenon that arises when the probability of negative outcomes is estimated, and that, in line with our research aims, may have an impact on the causal-attribution process.

Causal attribution is an essential mental process for adapting to the physical and social environment (Heider, 1958; Malle, 2004). Research in social psychology has distinguished several dimensions that help systematically describe the causes attributed to behaviors, including locus of causality, controllability, and stability (Weiner, 1979). For the needs of applied research, further work has extended this categorization by adding two dimensions of specificity related to the individuals involved and the outcome (Stratton et al., 1986). Leeds Attributional Coding System (LACS, Stratton, Munton, Hanks, Hard, & Davidson, 1988) is a clinical tool designed for categorizing spontaneous causal attributions. According to LACS, most causes can be identified as:

- *internal*, originating in an actor's personality or behavior, or *external*, originating in situational elements or other people;

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- 80 • *controllable* or *uncontrollable*, to the extent that any individual
81 involved in the situation can or cannot have an influence on the out-
82 come without effort;
- 83 • *stable*, whose influence is maintained beyond one particular outcome,
84 or *unstable*;
- 85 • *global*, which can bring about a variety of potential outcomes, or
86 *specific*, restricted only to certain types of outcomes;
- 87 • *personal*, distinct to an individual, or *universal*.

88 Since individual cognitive resources and time available for process-
89 ing information are limited, causal attribution is not a systematic exam-
90 ination, but is based on efficient mental schemes (Kelley, 1987) that are
91 likely to produce biases. Thus, attributions (as described by the afore-
92 mentioned dimensions) can vary according to the perpetrator's level
93 of involvement and the valence of the outcome. Several attributional
94 biases, such as the actor-observer effect (AOE, Jones & Nisbett, 1971;
95 for a review, see Malle, 2006; Watson, 1982) and the self-serving
96 bias (SSB, for a review, see Arkin, Cooper, & Kolditz, 1980; Mezulis,
97 Abramson, Hyde, & Hankin, 2004), are firmly established and well
98 documented in the psychological literature.

100 AOE consists on a systematic discrepancy, between the actor and an
101 observer, in the attribution of a cause to a behavior. In this effect, the
102 actor has a tendency to explain his/her own behavior by external causes,
103 while the observer attributes causes internal to the actor. Three types
104 of explanations for AOE have been proposed. First, the actor and the
105 observer do not have the same type and/or amount of information
106 about the actor (Nisbett, Caputo, Legant, & Marecek, 1973). Second,
107 since the actor is naturally focusing on his/her environment and the
108 observer is focusing on the actor, attention or visual perspective could
109 also explain this effect (Storms, 1973). Third, as Nisbett et al. (1973)
110 suggested, actors are thought to be motivated to refer to external causes
111 so as not to lose their sense of freedom.

112 SSB is a phenomenon linked to the motivation to preserve a positive
113 self-image (Bradley, 1978; Zuckerman, 1979). SSB is similar to AOE, but
114 only for negative outcomes. When the outcome is negative, actors
115 would indeed attribute external causes to explain their own behavior
116 in order to downplay their responsibility for the outcome. However,
117 when the outcome is positive, actors would explain it using internal
118 causes so as to emphasize their personal qualities. Observers would
119 either not show the same response pattern or show the reverse pattern
120 (Wells, Petty, Harkins, Kagehiro, & Harvey, 1977).

121 In the realm of traffic psychology, attribution biases have been
122 studied in research on driving behavior. A study by Bordel et al.
123 (2007) is of particular interest because it analyzes reports of real, severe
124 crashes, obtained by the French police from witnesses and drivers
125 considered at fault. Moreover, since external attributions by at-fault
126 drivers were found to be particularly frequent for very severe crashes,
127 the authors interpreted the observed actor-observer asymmetries in
128 attribution in terms of SSB or defensive attribution (Walster, 1966;
129 for a review, see Burger, 1981; for an example of application in the
130 field of traffic psychology, see Baldwin & Kleinke, 1994). Several other
131 studies have found AOE in attributions of causes to risky driving. The
132 driver behaviors targeted in those experiments were either defined
133 generally (as "your" or "your friend's" risky driving; Harré, Brandt,
134 & Houkamau, 2004) or presented to the participants by means of
135 scenarios (videotaped or written) that showed the actor's perspective
136 (i.e., the driver at fault) and/or the observer's perspective (i.e., a
137 bystander or another driver; Baxter, Macrae, Manstead, & Stradling,
138 1990; Hennessy & Jakubowski, 2007; Herzog, 1994; Lennon, Watson,
139 Arlidge, & Fraine, 2011).

140 Differences between the perception of oneself and of others are also
141 apparent in risk assessments. In general, people tend to be overly opti-
142 mistic, in such a way that they underestimate their own risk of undergo-
143 ing a negative event in comparison to the risk of others (Weinstein,
144 1980). Claimed to play a positive role in facing health problems
145 (Taylor & Brown, 1988), the impact of this optimism can also be seen

as equivocal for behavioral adaptation to risks in a health-related 146
context (Schwarzer, 1994). However, it seems that there are a number 147
of relationships between such comparative optimism and self-efficacy 148
with respect to self-protection (Desrichard, Verlhac, & Milhabet, 149
2001). In the field of research on driver behavior and the risks inherent 150
in driving, comparative judgments have also been studied extensively 151
in terms of assessments of one's driving skills as a means of control- 152
ling risks (Delhomme, 1991, 1995; Sundström, 2008). Regardless of 153
whether the comparative optimism is displayed with respect to the 154
skill level or the perceived risk of being involved in a crash, research 155
results fail to unambiguously show a link between the magnitude of 156
the bias and actual risk-taking behavior (Delhomme, 2000). Moreover, 157
it remains unclear to what extent the basis of drivers' comparative judg- 158
ments are experiential or illusory (Causse, Delhomme, & Kouabenan, 159
2005a; Causse, Kouabenan, & Delhomme, 2007; Delhomme, Verlhac, 160
& Martha, 2009). However, studies in which drivers are explicitly 161
asked to give explanations for their risk assessments in several specific 162
driving situations have shown that attributions of causes to one's own 163
risks differ from the attributions of causes to others' risks (Causse 164
et al., 2005a; Causse, Delhomme, & Kouabenan, 2005b). More specifi- 165
cally, drivers tend to explain their own level of risk in terms of abiding 166
by traffic laws while explaining others' level of risk in terms of violations 167
and lack of control (Causse et al., 2005b). In the present study, we 168
further explore the influence of comparative judgments on causal attri- 169
butions in specific risky driving situations. 170

This study has three aims. First, to apply the LACS in order to categor- 171
ize causes attributed to behaviors resulting in a near crash. Second, to 172
analyze comparative judgments of driving skills and of being involved 173
as a driver in a crash, in order to estimate the extent to which drivers 174
display comparative optimism. Third, to explore the relationships be- 175
tween the dimensions of causal attribution, attribution of responsibility 176
for the near crash, and comparative judgments. We employ a methodol- 177
ogy that we find more ecologically valid than hypothetical scenarios, 178
namely, the analysis of self-reports about near crashes that occurred 179
during everyday driving. 180

181 2. Materials and methods

182 2.1. Participants

The participants were 154 car drivers (72 females) averaging 183
39 years of age ($\sigma = 13.58$, $min = 23$, $max = 77$). They had had their 184
driver's license for 18.9 years on average ($\sigma = 13.12$) and had driven 185
a car for an annual average of 16,366 ($\sigma = 8806.69$) kilometers. In the 186
sample, 59 participants had been involved in at least a minor collision 187
during the three years preceding the study, and 83 had already lost 188
points for various driving violations. They were all holders of a vehicle 189
insurance policy from the insurance company that financed the study 190
and received a financial compensation of 50€ for their participation. 191

192 2.2. Measures

There were three sources of information: a pre-experimental ques- 193
tionnaire ("Driving Habits Sheet"), a logbook ("Near-Crash Sheet"), 194
and a post-experimental questionnaire ("Final Sheet"). The pre- 195
experimental questionnaire contained questions about demographic 196
characteristics (age, gender, kilometers driven, etc.) and about the 197
participants' driving habits (motives for car use and habitual trips 198
by car). The logbook served to describe a near crash by means of 199
open- and closed-ended questions. In the logbook, the participant also 200
identified the road users involved in the event, attributed responsibility 201
for its occurrence (to the self vs. another road user), and specified the 202
behavior deemed to have caused it. 203

The post-experimental questionnaire contained additional ques- 204
tions about driver characteristics (habitual speeds, prior involvement 205
in crashes, driver's license points lost, etc.), as well as questions 206

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