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Do I care if others lie? Current and future effects when lies can be delegated

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Highlights

- In a sender-receiver game senders delegate deception to distance themselves from the inflicted harm.
- In a subsequent dictator game senders who have deceived in a first stage give more money to a stranger, apparently to cleanse their conscience.
- We find different types: Senders who seem to depend on a clean conscience and senders who don't. The former delegate deception and, after a successful deception, give more money to a stranger. The latter do not delegate deception and give less money.

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