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Dynamic Bargaining and Normative Conflict

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Highlights

- We study a situation in which different social norms prescribe different behavior, which may lead to normative conflict.
- We study the dynamics of normative conflict in a repeated bargaining experiment.
- We show how normative conflict may eventually be resolved by converging to a common norm and characterize the resulting social norms.
- Convergence to a shared norm is likely in simple and complex situations, but unlikely in moderately complex situations.

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