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Language and Lies

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Highlights

- The strength of a message can affect whether or not an individual tells the truth.
- An experiment measures how message type affects a sender's intrinsic lie aversion.
- "Strong" vs. "weak" messages significantly promote truthfulness in the experiment.
- Stronger messages are found to increase truth-telling by 30 percentage points.
- Differential aversion to "weak" vs. "strong" lies can be socially advantageous.

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