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Taking Aversion

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Highlights

- New experiment to measure whether dictators prefer a giving game to a taking game with identical payoff possibilities.
- Most dictators prefer the giving game
- Aversion to taking is strong: dictators are willing to sacrifice 31% of endowment to avoid taking.
- Consistent with Levitt and List's model of social preferences: moral cost of taking exceeds the moral cost of not giving.

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