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Short-Termism of Executive Compensation

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Highlights

- Project life spans may be longer than the tenure of their undertaking managers.
- Optimal contracting with conflicting intergenerational incentives appears myopic.
- Information rents flow to future managers in intergenerational projects.
- Current managers favor lower quality short-run projects to capture information rents.



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