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Author: Rosario Macera

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Present or Future Incentives?  
On the Optimality of Fixed Wages with Moral Hazard

Rosario Macera

School of Business and Economics  
Universidad de Los Andes, Chile  
Monseñor Alvaro del Portillo 12455, Las Condes, Santiago, Chile  
E-mail: rmacera@uandes.cl

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