


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**Who Cooperates in Repeated Games:  
The Role of Altruism, Inequity Aversion, and Demographics**

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Highlights

We explore the role of altruism and inequity aversion in supporting cooperation in repeated games

We include various proxies of social preferences, including dictator game giving

Cooperation in repeated games appears to be mainly motivated by payoff maximization

Abstract

We explore the extent to which altruism, as measured by giving in a dictator game (DG), accounts for play in a noisy version of the repeated prisoner's dilemma. We find that DG

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