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
Conflict Resolution through Voluntary Provision of Property Protection

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# Voluntary Provision of Property Rights

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## Abstract

The results of an experimental test of Nash equilibrium predictions of voluntary provision of property rights in a contest game are reported. The experiment investigates whether pre-commitment induces positive provision of property rights due to the strategic effect on conflict, resulting in greater production. Although, Nash equilibrium predictions are rejected, the comparative statics of the model are largely supported. Voluntary contributions to property rights are greater with pre-commitment, resulting in less conflict and more production. While property rights are unaffected by group-size, conflict is greater and production is lower with larger groups.

**Keywords:** Property Rights; Conflict; Rent-Seeking; Contests; Public Good Games; Experiments

**JEL Classifications:** C72; C91; F35; O12; O43; P48

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