Accepted Manuscript

Moral hazard with non-additive uncertainty: When are actions implementable?

Martin Dumav, Urmee Khan

PII: S0165-1765(18)30251-9
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.06.028
Reference: ECOLET 8101

To appear in: *Economics Letters*

Received date : 4 March 2018
Revised date : 25 June 2018
Accepted date : 28 June 2018

Please cite this article as: Dumav M., Khan U., Moral hazard with non-additive uncertainty: When are actions implementable?. *Economics Letters* (2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.06.028

This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof before it is published in its final form. Please note that during the production process errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain.

Highlights

* A moral hazard problem with finite number of actions and uncertainty described by a set of probabilities associated with each action

* Implementation of actions require sufficient disjointedness between the sets of probabilities generated by different actions

* A fixed wage plus bonus payment implements actions

Download English Version:

https://daneshyari.com/en/article/7348575

Download Persian Version:

https://daneshyari.com/article/7348575

Daneshyari.com