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On the characterization of Nash equilibrium action distributions of large distributional games

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
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Highlights

- 1. We characterize the Nash equilibrium action distribution in a large distributional game.
- 2. We characterize the symmetric Nash equilibrium action distribution in an atomless large distributional game.
- 3. We show that a symmetric Nash equilibrium action distribution in any atomless large distributional game can be characterized if and only if the action set is at most countable.

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