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Rationalizability and mixed strategies in large games

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Highlights:

- Game with a continuum of players that have the same finite set of available actions.
- Payoff of each player depends on her action and the aggregate state of the game.
- We define the sets of (Point-)Rationalizable States in terms of pure and mixed strategies.
- Whether we use pure or mixed strategies, we get the same Rationalizable sets.
- In general, Point-Rationalizable States sets differ from Rationalizable States sets.

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