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Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation

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Highlights

- We consider object reallocation problems with strict preferences.
 We study manipulation via endowments.
 We propose the notion of endowments-swapping-proofness.
 We characterize TTC in terms of endowments-swapping-proofness.

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