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

On Pure-Strategy Equilibria in Games with Correlated Information

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Highlights

- An equivalence result holds in a class of correlated information games.
- Pure strategy equilibrium exists in such correlated information games.
- A 1982 counterexample can be resolved by using a simpler Lebesgue extension.
- An Appendix is devoted to an intuitive construction of this Lebesgue extension.

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