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The Lattice of Envy-free Matchings

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
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Highlights

- The paper studies the envy-free matchings of a many-to-one matching model, which are matchings which can only be unstable with respect to a blocking pair of a worker with a firm that has some unfilled positions.
- These envy-free but unstable (i.e. wasteful) matchings may arise in the course of filling “vacancy chains” following e.g. the retirement of a worker if his or her replacement will cause a vacancy at another firm.
- The set of envy free matchings is a lattice under the partial ordering of the common preferences of the workers.

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