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

The Skipping-down strategy and stability in school choice problems with affirmative action: Theory and experiment

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Highlights

- Two affirmative action mechanisms in school choice problems are examined.
- The minority reserve mechanism is more efficient than the majority quota mechanism.
- Deviation from the dominant strategy (skipping-down) was observed in the lab.
- But the skipping-down strategy constitute Nash equilibrium in some environment.
- This makes the majority quota mechanism more stable than the other.

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