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

Separability and decomposition in mechanism design with transfers

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Highlights

- Under additively separable type space, we show that every dominant strategy incentive compatible and unanimous mechanism is decomposable.
- We show that such mechanisms must be weighted utilitarianism.
- The decomposition result does not work if unanimity is relaxed.

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