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Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities

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
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Highlights

- We consider the indivisible object allocation problem with weak priorities.
- We characterize the priority structures for which a stable and efficient rule exists, and the priority structures for which a stable, efficient and (group) strategy-proof rule exists.
- When there are more than three objects, a stable, efficient and group strategy-proof rule exists if and only if the problem can be decomposed into a sequence of house allocation or housing market subproblems.

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