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Cooperation in partly observable networked markets

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
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## Highlights

- A model of repeated games in networks with competing interactions and flexible observability structure.
- Characterization of networks that enable sustainable cooperation.
- Incentives for cooperation depend only on local neighborhoods of players.
- With uncertainty over the network structure, incentives to cooperate can be calculated as if the network were a random tree.

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