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

Selecting efficient correlated equilibria through distributed learning

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Highlights

- Dynamics that converge to (coarse) correlated equilibria are widely studied in the existing literature.
- Existing dynamics guarantee that the empirical frequency of play will converge to the set of CCE.
- We provide a simple payoff-based learning algorithm that guarantees that the empirical frequency of play converges to efficient CCE.
- Presented algorithm is an extension of Young's, "Learning by Trial and Error", where the focus shifts from stabilizing pure NE to CCE.