

Accepted Manuscript

Evaluationwise strategy-proofness

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
PII: S0899-8256(17)30182-3
DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.010>
Reference: YGAME 2763

To appear in: *Games and Economic Behavior*

Received date: 26 August 2016

Please cite this article in press as: Erdamar, B., et al. Evaluationwise strategy-proofness. *Games Econ. Behav.* (2017), <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.010>

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Highlights

- A new concept of nonmanipulation, called evaluationwise strategy-proofness, is proposed in the preference-approval model.
- Anonymity, efficiency, and evaluationwise strategy-proofness are shown to be incompatible.
- When either anonymity or efficiency is weakened, we have positive results.

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