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Incentives through Inventory Control in Supply Chains

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Highlights

- The paper studies the incentive problems associated with inventory control in a supply chain, in which an upstream firm (manufacturer) sells goods through downstream firms (retailers).
- Incentive distortions arise when retailers have to allocate inventory over time.
- Different distortions arise with competitive than with exclusive retailers.
- Assigning inventory control to the manufacturer solves these distortions and improves intertemporal price discrimination, but may reduce social welfare.

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