

Internet Regulation, Two-Sided Pricing, and Sponsored Data

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PII: S0167-7187(18)30018-3
DOI: [10.1016/j.ijindorg.2018.02.007](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2018.02.007)
Reference: INDOR 2430



To appear in: *International Journal of Industrial Organization*

Received date: 3 January 2016
Revised date: 2 January 2018
Accepted date: 25 February 2018

Please cite this article as: Bruno Jullien, Wilfried Sand-Zantman, Internet Regulation, Two-Sided Pricing, and Sponsored Data, *International Journal of Industrial Organization* (2018), doi: [10.1016/j.ijindorg.2018.02.007](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2018.02.007)

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Highlights

- We model a network that intermediates traffic between consumers and heterogeneous providers of free content.
- We show that it is optimal for the network to propose menus of tariffs such that high-benefit content providers can sponsor consumer usage.
- We discuss the welfare effects of allowing sponsored data and show that they depend on the proportion of content targeted and the value of such content.
- We extend these results to the case of competing networks, multidimensional heterogeneity among content providers, and discuss the consequences of the coexistence of free and paid contents.

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