

Retail Channel Management in Consumer Search Markets

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PII: S0167-7187(16)30284-3
DOI: [10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.05.004](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.05.004)
Reference: INDOR 2370



To appear in: *International Journal of Industrial Organization*

Received date: 9 October 2016
Revised date: 7 April 2017
Accepted date: 11 May 2017

Please cite this article as: Daniel Garcia, Maarten Janssen, Retail Channel Management in Consumer Search Markets, *International Journal of Industrial Organization* (2017), doi: [10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.05.004](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.05.004)

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Highlights

- Model of Consumer Search with Multiple Retailers and a Monopolist Manufacturer.
- Manufacturer can choose asymmetric contracts and has various levels of commitment.
- Asymmetric contracts are optimal to encourage consumer search and reduce price dispersion.
- Prices across stores may be positively or negatively correlated.

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