

Accepted Manuscript

The spillover effect of enforcement actions on bank risk-taking

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PII: S0378-4266(18)30076-1
DOI: [10.1016/j.jbankfin.2018.04.008](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2018.04.008)
Reference: JBF 5329

To appear in: *Journal of Banking and Finance*

Received date: 14 February 2017
Revised date: 23 February 2018
Accepted date: 11 April 2018

Please cite this article as: Stefano Caiazza , Matteo Cotugno , Franco Fiordelisi , Valeria Stefanelli ,
The spillover effect of enforcement actions on bank risk-taking, *Journal of Banking and Finance* (2018),
doi: [10.1016/j.jbankfin.2018.04.008](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2018.04.008)

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Highlights:

- We analyze the consequence of sanctions in banking
- We show that credit risk-related sanctions lead banks to off-load non performing loans
- We show that credit risk-related sanctions lead banks reduce their lending orientation
- We demonstrate that non-sanctioned banks behave in a similar manner of the sanctioned one

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