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Private Enforcement, Corruption, and Antitrust Design

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Highlights

- We examine how corruption affects private antitrust enforcement and antitrust design.
- We distinguish between corruption in courts versus in antitrust agency enforcement.
- Private enforcement can be social welfare-enhancing under corruption.
- Corruption can even increase the social desirability of private enforcement.
- We show that appropriate design of antitrust institutions is context-specific.

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