

Accepted Manuscript

Family networks and school choice

Andrew Dustan

PII: S0304-3878(18)30809-5

DOI: [10.1016/j.jdeveco.2018.06.004](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2018.06.004)

Reference: DEVEC 2246

To appear in: *Journal of Development Economics*

Received Date: 28 June 2017

Revised Date: 6 March 2018

Accepted Date: 11 June 2018

Please cite this article as: Dustan, A., Family networks and school choice, *Journal of Development Economics* (2018), doi: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2018.06.004.

This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof before it is published in its final form. Please note that during the production process errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain.



Family Networks and School Choice

Andrew Dustan*
Department of Economics
Vanderbilt University

March 5, 2018

Abstract

This paper uses variation in school assignments generated by Mexico City’s public high school choice mechanism to document a strong causal influence of older siblings on their younger siblings’ school choice behavior. The effects of older sibling admission on the probabilities of choosing both the sibling’s school and distinct but observably similar schools are large and positive, even when siblings are too far apart in age to attend school together. The evidence is more consistent with information transmission and path dependence channels than cost, convenience, sibling competition, or parental pressure. Sibling-induced changes in stated preferences affect admissions outcomes, including assignment to elite schools. The results imply significant externalities from policies such as affirmative action that alter the distribution of school assignments, as well as providing insight into the role of family networks in decision-making regarding educational investments.

JEL Codes: I20, I25, O15

*E-mail: andrew.dustan@vanderbilt.edu. I thank Alain de Janvry, Elisabeth Sadoulet, Fred Finan, Ben Faber, Jeremy Magruder, and Ted Miguel for helpful comments. Participants at various UC Berkeley seminars, the Northeast Universities Development Consortium Conference, the Pacific Conference for Development, Fourth SOLE/EALE World Meetings, and several other seminars provided useful feedback. Roberto Peña Reséndiz supplied the COMIPEMS data on behalf of the Secretariat of Public Education and offered excellent insight into the school selection process. Rafael de Hoyos and the advisors at the Subsecretariat of Upper Secondary Education provided invaluable assistance with the data in early stages of the project. This research was funded in part by grants from the Institute of Business & Economic Research and the Weiss Family Fellowship through the Center for Effective Global Action. This paper previously circulated under the title “Peer Networks and School Choice under Incomplete Information.”

Download English Version:

<https://daneshyari.com/en/article/7357598>

Download Persian Version:

<https://daneshyari.com/article/7357598>

[Daneshyari.com](https://daneshyari.com)