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Indeterminacy in Credit Economies*

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Abstract

We characterize the equilibrium set of a two-good, pure-credit economy with limited commitment, under both pairwise and centralized meetings. We show that the set of equilibria derived under “not-too-tight” solvency constraints (Alvarez and Jermann, 2000) commonly used in the literature is of measure zero in the whole set of Perfect Bayesian Equilibria. There exist a continuum of stationary equilibria, a continuum of endogenous credit cycles of any periodicity, and a continuum of sunspot equilibria, irrespective of the assumed trading mechanism. Equilibria featuring “too-tight” solvency constraints can generate growing credit limits over time, periodic credit shutdowns, and heterogeneous debt limits across ex-ante identical borrowers. Moreover, we provide examples of credit cycles that dominate, from a social welfare point of view, all equilibria with “not-too-tight” solvency constraints.

JEL Classification: D83, E32, E51

Keywords: Credit cycles, limited commitment, money.

*Contact: zab2t@virginia.edu (Bethune), taiwei.hu@bristol.ac.uk (Hu), and grochete@uci.edu (Rocheteau). An earlier version of this paper circulated under the title “Dynamic Indeterminacy and Welfare in Credit Economies.” We thank Francesca Carapella for her thoughtful discussion of our paper at the Mad Money Meeting at the University of Wisconsin, and seminar participants at CREST in Paris, National University of Singapore, University of California at Irvine, University of California at Los Angeles, University of Hawaii at Manoa, University of Iowa, Purdue University, the Mid-West S&M Workshop, the workshop on “Modeling Monetary Economies” in the honor of Bruce Champ held at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, the workshop on “Money as a Medium of Exchange: KW at 25!” held at UC Santa Barbara, the 2014 Summer Workshop on Money, Banking, Payments and Finance at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, the Sao Paulo School of Economics, 11th Annual GE Conference at Yale, and National Taiwan University.

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