

Accepted Manuscript

Firm Performance when Ownership is very Concentrated: Evidence from a Semiparametric Panel

Malika Hamadi, Andréas Heinen

PII: S0927-5398(15)00081-X
DOI: doi: [10.1016/j.jempfin.2015.07.004](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jempfin.2015.07.004)
Reference: EMPFIN 819

To appear in: *Journal of Empirical Finance*

Received date: 25 July 2015
Accepted date: 30 July 2015



Please cite this article as: Hamadi, Malika, Heinen, Andréas, Firm Performance when Ownership is very Concentrated: Evidence from a Semiparametric Panel, *Journal of Empirical Finance* (2015), doi: [10.1016/j.jempfin.2015.07.004](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jempfin.2015.07.004)

This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof before it is published in its final form. Please note that during the production process errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain.

Firm Performance when Ownership is very Concentrated: Evidence from a Semiparametric Panel

Malika Hamadi[¶]

CRENoS, University of Sassari

Andréas Heinen[§]

THEMA, Université de Cergy-Pontoise

July 25, 2015

Abstract

We consider the effect on performance of very large controlling shareholders, who are mostly organized in voting blocks and business groups, in a sample of Belgian listed firms from 1991 to 2006. Since the shape of the relation between ownership and firm value is a controversial issue in corporate finance, we use semiparametric local-linear kernel-based panel models. These models allow us not to impose a priori functional restrictions on the relation between ownership and performance. Our semiparametric analysis shows that the effect on performance varies depending on the size of ownership stakes and that there are departures from linearity, especially in family firms. Our results suggest that this non-linearity in family firms is related to whether or not the CEO is a family member.

Keywords: Semiparametric panel, Ownership concentration, Large shareholders, Firm performance, Family firms.

JEL Classification: *C14; C23; G32*

[¶]Department of Economics and Business, University of Sassari and Center for North South Economic Research (CRENoS). Address: Via Torre Tonda 34, 07100 Sassari, Italy. Email: malika.hamadi@gmail.com. Phone (Office): +39 079 201 7328

[§]THEMA, Université de Cergy-Pontoise. Address: 33 Boulevard du Port, 95011 Cergy-Pontoise, France. Email: Andreas.Heinen@u-cergy.fr. This research has been conducted as part of the project Labex MME-DII (ANR11-LBX-0023-01).

Download English Version:

<https://daneshyari.com/en/article/7360758>

Download Persian Version:

<https://daneshyari.com/article/7360758>

[Daneshyari.com](https://daneshyari.com)