## Author's Accepted Manuscript

Policy spillovers in the regulation of multiple pollutants

Stefan Ambec, Jessica Coria



PII: S0095-0696(17)30022-0

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2017.05.011 DOI:

**YJEEM2046** Reference:

To appear in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

Received date: 17 January 2017

Cite this article as: Stefan Ambec and Jessica Coria, Policy spillovers in the regulation of multiple pollutants, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2017.05.011

This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted fo publication. As a service to our customers we are providing this early version o the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting galley proof before it is published in its final citable form Please note that during the production process errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain

#### ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

## Policy spillovers in the regulation of multiple pollutants

#### May 2017

#### Abstract

We analyze the interplay between policies aimed to control transboundary and local pollutants such as greenhouse gases and particulate matter. The two types of pollution interact in the abatement cost function of the polluting firms through economies or diseconomies of scope. They are regulated by distinct entities, potentially with different instruments that are designed according to some specific agenda. We show that the choice of regulatory instrument and the timing of the regulations matter for efficiency. Emissions of the local pollutant are distorted if the regulators anticipate that transboundary pollution will later be regulated through emission caps. The regulation is too stringent with diseconomies of scope, and not enough with economies of scope. In contrast, we obtain efficiency if the transboundary pollutant is regulated by emission taxes or tradable emission permits provided that the revenue from taxing emissions are redistributed to the countries in a lump-sum way and that the initial allocation of tradable emission permits is not linked to abatement costs.

Key Words: environmental regulation, transboundary pollution, multiple-pollutants, co-benefits, ancillary benefits, emission tax, emission standard, tradable emissions permits.

JEL classification: D62, H23, Q50, Q53, Q54, Q58.

### Download English Version:

# https://daneshyari.com/en/article/7361482

Download Persian Version:

https://daneshyari.com/article/7361482

<u>Daneshyari.com</u>