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# Procedurally Fair Implementation Under Complete Information

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## Abstract

We derive a necessary and a sufficient condition for Nash implementation with a procedurally fair mechanism. Our result has a nice analogue with the path-breaking result of Maskin [Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality, *Rev. Econ. Stud.* **66** (1999) 23-38.], and therefore, it allows us to give a simple characterization of those choice rules that are implementable, but not in a procedurally fair way. This reveals the constraints that insisting on procedural fairness impose on the collective.

JEL CLASSIFICATION CODES: C72; D64; D70; D71

KEYWORDS: Characterization; Implementation; Nash equilibrium; Ex ante fairness; Ex post fairness; Symmetry

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