

Accepted Manuscript

On the generic robustness of solution concepts to incomplete information

Guilherme Carmona

PII: S0304-4068(17)30141-6

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.12.003>

Reference: MATECO 2203

To appear in: *Journal of Mathematical Economics*

Received date: 22 June 2017

Revised date: 30 October 2017

Accepted date: 8 December 2017

Please cite this article as: Carmona G., On the generic robustness of solution concepts to incomplete information. *Journal of Mathematical Economics* (2017), <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.12.003>

This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof before it is published in its final form. Please note that during the production process errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain.



On the Generic Robustness of Solution Concepts to Incomplete Information*

Guilherme Carmona[†]

University of Surrey

October 30, 2017

Abstract

We consider the generic robustness of an upper hemi-continuous solution concept on a class of games of interest which has been embedded in a larger space of games. We show that generic robustness follows if the class of games of interest is “large” relative to the class of games in which it has been embedded. This result is used to show why interim correlated rationalizable actions are generically robust to players’ hierarchies of beliefs as established by Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) even without their richness condition. It is also used to provide a formal sense according to which, in the setting of Kajii and Morris (1997b), the set of representations of a complete information game is small in the space of incomplete information games in which it is embedded. This difference in relative sizes makes the robustness problems of Kajii and Morris (1997b) and Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) be incomparable and helps explaining why their conclusions differ so significantly.

*I wish to thank Christian Hellwig, Atsushi Kajii, Mário Páscoa, Satoru Takahashi and two anonymous referees for very helpful comments. Special thanks to Siyang Xiong for very detailed comments. Any remaining errors are, of course, mine.

[†]Address: University of Surrey, School of Economics, Guildford, GU2 7XH, UK; phone: (44) 148368 3475; email: g.carmona@surrey.ac.uk.

Download English Version:

<https://daneshyari.com/en/article/7367411>

Download Persian Version:

<https://daneshyari.com/article/7367411>

[Daneshyari.com](https://daneshyari.com)