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Rational Bubbles and Public Debt Policy: A Quantitative Analysis

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#### ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

#### Highlights

- Rational bubbles and Ponzi-schemes exist under plausible assumptions.
- There are large welfare gains from replacing private bubbles by public debt.
- Paying of public debt benefits at most a small group of wealthy indi-viduals.



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