

## Accepted Manuscript

Durable Coalitions and Communication: Public versus Private Negotiations

David P. Baron, Renee Bowen, Salvatore Nunnari

PII: S0047-2727(17)30145-7  
DOI: doi:[10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.09.002](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.09.002)  
Reference: PUBEC 3807

To appear in: *Journal of Public Economics*

Received date: 3 November 2016  
Revised date: 1 September 2017  
Accepted date: 4 September 2017



Please cite this article as: Baron, David P., Bowen, Renee, Nunnari, Salvatore, Durable Coalitions and Communication: Public versus Private Negotiations, *Journal of Public Economics* (2017), doi:[10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.09.002](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.09.002)

This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof before it is published in its final form. Please note that during the production process errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain.

# Durable Coalitions and Communication: Public versus Private Negotiations\*

**David P. Baron**      **Renee Bowen**      **Salvatore Nunnari**  
Stanford University      UC San Diego,      Bocconi University,  
CEPR and NBER      CEPR and IGIER

August 30, 2017

## Abstract

We present a laboratory experiment to study the effect of communication on durable coalitions – coalitions that support the same allocation from one period to the next. We study a bargaining setting where the status quo policy is determined by the policy implemented in the previous period. Our main experimental treatment is the opportunity for subjects to negotiate with one another through unrestricted cheap-talk communication before a proposal is made and comes to a vote. We compare committees with no communication, committees where communication is public and messages are observed by all committee members, and committees where communication is private and any committee member can send a private message to any other committee member. We find that the opportunity to communicate has a significant impact on outcomes and coalitions. When communication is public, there are more universal coalitions and fewer majoritarian coalitions. With private communication, there are more majoritarian coalitions and fewer universal coalitions. With either type of communication coalitions occur more frequently and last longer than with no communication. The volume and content of communication is correlated with coalition type. These findings suggest a coordination role for communication that varies with the mode of communication.

**Keywords:** Legislative Bargaining; Endogenous Status Quo; Laboratory Experiments; Communication.

---

\* We are grateful to Marina Agranov, Alessandra Casella, Giovanni Andreottola, Guillaume Fréchet, Drew Fudenberg, Dimitri Landa, Thomas Palfrey, Eduard Talamas, and seminar audiences at the 2014 Mini-Conference on Experimental Economics at Caltech, the 2014 Behavioral Models in Politics Conference at Duke, the 2016 Mini-Conference on Political Economy at Stanford University, the University of Warwick, the London School of Economics, Bocconi University, the University of Padua, University of Western Ontario, the 12th CSEF-IGIER Symposium on Economics and Institutions, the 2nd EIEF Political Economy Workshop, the University of Granada and WZB Berlin Social Science Center for helpful comments and interesting discussions. Elliott Ash, Neil Christy, Alexandr Lenk, and Anselm Rink provided excellent research assistance. Nunnari acknowledges financial support from the European Research Council (POLITICALMIND Grant No. 648833 and EVALIDEA Grant No. 295835).

Download English Version:

<https://daneshyari.com/en/article/7369671>

Download Persian Version:

<https://daneshyari.com/article/7369671>

[Daneshyari.com](https://daneshyari.com)