

Collaboration and Free-riding in Team Contests

Mürüvvet Büyükboyacı, Andrea Robbett

PII: S0927-5371(16)30401-8
DOI: [10.1016/j.labeco.2017.11.001](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2017.11.001)
Reference: LABECO 1595

To appear in: *Labour Economics*

Received date: 13 December 2016
Revised date: 24 October 2017
Accepted date: 7 November 2017

Please cite this article as: Mürüvvet Büyükboyacı, Andrea Robbett, Collaboration and Free-riding in Team Contests, *Labour Economics* (2017), doi: [10.1016/j.labeco.2017.11.001](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2017.11.001)

This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof before it is published in its final form. Please note that during the production process errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain.



Highlights

- We conduct a real-effort production experiment with two complementary tasks.
- Workers have heterogeneous skills in those tasks.
- The introduction of team incentives does not reduce worker effort.
- Workers coordinate to specialize in the task they perform best.
- Specialization in team contests increases productivity.
- Communication strengthens the ability to coordinate on task specialization.

Download English Version:

<https://daneshyari.com/en/article/7371477>

Download Persian Version:

<https://daneshyari.com/article/7371477>

[Daneshyari.com](https://daneshyari.com)